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Abstraction is the most valuable ladder 
of any science ... However, the task of 
science is not to climb up the easiest 
ladder and remain there forever distilling 
and redistilling the same pure stuff. 
Standard economics, by opposing any suggest­
ion that the economic process may consist 
of something more than a jigsaw puzzle with 
all its elements, given, has identified 
itself with dogmatism.
(Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, 1971)
1. Introduction ; the points to be argued
The present paper is an attempt to show that a con­
siderable part of the discussion of information processing 
on speculative markets in general and futures markets in 
particular is not very conducive to a better understanding 
of the market process. The theoretical impasse seems to be 
the consequence of a number of traditional and convenient 
abstractions. It will be argued
that the abstraction from the possible complexity of 
motives for futures trading allows one to dichotomize 
market participants into (routine) hedgers and spe­
culators but is an inadequate abstraction as far as it 
is conducive to the interpretation of trading on these 
markets as pure risk-shifting operations ;
that an abstraction from the multitude of observable 
types of transactions involving futures markets in 
favour of hedging and speculation only impedes rather 
than assists the analysis of these markets as public 
goods, allowing a division of labour in procuring, eval­
uating, and processing information potentially relevant 
for the future ;
that the abstraction from time, in order to allow a 
comparative static equilibrium analysis, and the use 




























































































possible to construct an artificial paradox of 
information which can be thoroughly misleading with 
respect to a proper understanding of competitive 
information activities and of information clearing 
via markets, if taken seriously ;
that the abstraction from uncertainty by introducing 
Muth-rational expectations as a de facto surrogate 
for certainty helps to save equilibrium analysis and 
is econometrically convenient but it represents a 
misconception of markets as information systems and 
does not explain in terms of testable propositions 
the information-cum-trading process which may lead to 
a temporary equilibrium.
Some observable exceptions and partially plausible 
deviations have to be set up against these theoretical 
developments. In addition, it seems to be necessary to 
point at well-published warnings against applying concepts 
like rational expectations which are, however, frequently 
by-passed without any comment. Finally, it will be argued 
that, particularly in the field of futures markets, more 
convincing theoretical concepts seem to have emerged from 
a scientific process in which theoretical reasoning and 
empirical analysis of these markets as well as of their 
institutional arrangements are closely interrelated. The 
results achieved in this way may n°t always have the formal 
elegance of "pure" economics but seem to be more adequate 
in a field where it is necessary "to describe a process of 
groping experiment and gambling for knowledge, of being 
wrong many times in order to be ultimately right" and not 
"what things will be like when, if ever, they have attained 
rightness"1.




























































































2 . Information clearing versus risk shifting
An important barrier towards the understanding of 
forward and futures markets proved to be Keynes' "theory 
of normal backwardation"1 which reduced the explanation 
of futures trading to a pure risk-shifting operation. Using 
some unrevealed statistics on seasonal price variations in 
organized markets as a base, he suggested that there exists 
a general, and sizeable bias in futures prices from which 
those •• who take "long" positions tend to benefit. Since 
hedgers, conventionally defined, tend to be (net) short in 
futures, the bias could be interpreted as a premium paid by 
them as the more risk-avert to the less risk-avert speculators 
who tend to be (net) long.
2The theory was subsequently refined but without taking 
much notice of two challenges on factual grounds : First, it 
proved to be difficult to muster sufficient evidence to 
support the existence of a general and sizeable bias despite 
the improvement of statistical methods and records. The com­
paratively few pieces of positive evidence can be more 
convincingly explained by market imperfections. A bias tends to 
be observable on thin futures markets with too little speculat-
3ion compared to hedging demand . But in general, speculators 
do not seem to be able to earn a scarcity rent on futures 
markets which would lend itself to interpretation as a risk 
premium. Hence their presence requires a more satisfactory 
explanation. Second, the business practice of hedgers which 
would be in line with the theory of normal backwardation does 
not seem to coincide with their observable behaviour. If it 123
1. J.M. Keynes (1930), pp. 137 f, 143 f. For a brief discussion of the 
development of the theory of normal backwardation see, for example,
R.W. Gray and D.J.S. Rutledge (1971), pp. 65 ff.
2. E.g. J.R. Hicks (1939), pp. 137 ff.
3. Corresponding evidence has been initially provided by R.W. Gray (1960) . 
For more recent evidence see D.E.A. Giles and B.A. Goss (1980) , who 
found that for the Sydney Wool Futures Market a bias can be observed 
during its initial period (1963-1967). It disappeared, however, there­




























































































were in general purely a matter of risk shifting against a 
premium, routine hedging would be the normal case. But 
compared to the wide range of discretionary forms of hedging 
actually used, this seems to be the exception rather than 
the rule. Obviously, hedgers take a much more active part in 
futures trading than just trying to avoid risks1.
A possible explanation for the presence of speculators
not in receipt of a significant risk premium would be that
2they are not risk-averse on balance . However, they also do
not seem to gamble because there is sufficient evidence that
some of them systematically earn profits whereas others do 3not . Even if this were be disregarded, the attitude towards 
risk remains an unsatisfactory criterion of abstraction in 
view of the existence of discretionary hedging. However, it 
would be equally one-sided to question risk reduction as a 
central motive for hedging. The relevant point is that the 
price for being able to unload risk onto the futures markets 
can be reduced by information activities. Thereby the minimum 
a potential hedger can do is to use the information he acquires 
via his business in actuals as a basis for forming his own 
expectations. Routine hedging, on the other hand, would mean 
that either no price-expectations or beliefs are formed at 
all or that a hedger never trusts his own beliefs. He would 
always be satisfied with locking in a futures price.
Informationi_divergent_beliefs__and_futures_pricing 
Much more compatible with the evidence seems to be the 123
1. This has already been suggested by G.W. Hoffman (1932) , pp. 409, 
418. Later on it was primarily H. Working (1953), who forcefully 
argued in favour of a revision of the then still daninant concept 
of hedging. However, outside the analysis of futures markets, the 
theoretical reasoning on hedging renamed comparatively unaffected.
2. M. Friedman (1969), p. 286.
3. See, for example, the analysis of returns to futures traders by 




























































































contention that most market participants speculate in the 
sense that each of them "hopes to exploit the general 
insufficiency of knowledge and hopes to do so despite the 
recognized insufficiency of his own"1. Access to this 
information concept of futures trading may be gained by 
considering, for example, a short hedge which proves to 
be profitable when compared with holding a long position 
in unhedged actuals, i.e. speculating in actuals. Subject 
to the transaction costs incurred, this is the the case 
if (1) the difference between futures and actuals' price 
(the basxs) changes in favour of a trader which (2) also 
requires a change in the futures price. Even the borderline- 
case of a perfect hedge (a constant basis) only provides 
(non-money) profits in terms of effective risk-shifting if 
the futures price changes. This, however, has interesting 
implications with respect to the predictive quality of a 
futures price from the point of view of an individual trader.
Consider the trader who engages in discretionary 
2hedging . If his participation in futures trading is not 
governed by chance he must have beliefs as to the actuals' 
price at the expiry date of the contract differing from the 
de-facto forecast provided by the futures price. His beliefs 
could be founded(l)on intuition but also(2)on a different eval­
uation of generally available information of predictive value 
or (3) on information so far inaccessible to many or all other 
market participants. If he is able to establish his position 
at a futures price he considers to be a wrong forecast , those 
who are prepared to hold the opposite position, in general, 
must have opposing beliefs.
In order to conceptualize the process of adjustment of 
prices to different informative situations of traders, it is 12
1. G.L.S. Shackle (1972), p. 158.
2. The discretion goes further than the one implied in the following 
reasoning. It also includes conscious mismatching of the volume of 
hedging transactions and the quantities in actuals (either over- or 
underhedging) as well as mismatching of the time structures (delayed 




























































































useful to consider the time-structure of trading and the 
likely underlying beliefs. Two different trading rounds 
can be distinguished, one prior and one posterior to a new 
informative situation 'of the market as a whole1. In the 
prior round, a trader establishes a portfolio position 
which he hopes to revise at a profit via re-trading in a 
posterior round. This would be the case if the uncertainty 
concerning the future actuals' price is partly or totally 
removed in a way, consistent with his intuition or the state 
of information on which he based his belief. Total removal 
corresponds to the situation at the close of trading of 
the contract in question. A consensus is then imposed on the 
futures market by the factual situation on the actuals' 
market. Partial removal in the intermediate period would 
take place in the way a trader hopes, if(l) his own 
informative situation would become more or less general 
and if similar or identical conclusions were drawn from this 
situation by other market participants, or (2) if other 
information reached the market favouring a price move similar 
to the one consistent with his own expectations. This would 
give the change in beliefs sufficient weight to move the 
futures price consistent with the newly expected price. It 
implies a partial consensus of market participants, namely 
with respect to the direction in which the prevailing futures 
price has to be revised. But in order to allow the particip­
ants to trade in a potentially profitable way on their changed 
beliefs they must be able to trade at a price which does not 
perfectly reflect their own informative situation and the 
respective beliefs related to it. Otherwise they would have 
no incentive to trade because they could merely expect to 
incur transaction costs. The same applies to those who consider 
engaging in the opposite position. And it is up to them to 
eventually provide a resistance line to the price movement
1. This distinction has been emphasized by J. Hirshleifer (1977) . But 
the following reasoning differs from the one of Hirshleifer who uses 
"consensus beliefs" as a fictious reference system for defining 





























































































with their engagement. Hence, in the period before the 
closing of trade, any price movement cannot be expected 
to be arrested at a consensus of beliefs with respect to 
the future actuals' price. Trading at subjectively false 
prices will be the rule.
The preceding reasoning has to be qualified in the 
sense that it applies primarily to the establishment of 
new open positions in futures. These may come from discre­
tionary hedgers and from speculators in the conventional 
sense, furthermore the price movement may have upset the 
price structure of the various contracts traded and in 
the case of a storable commodity, the relation to the 
current actuals' price. As a consequence, there may be 
opportunities for spreading and arbitrage. Here again, these 
will be taken largely on divergent beliefs or in the case 
of pure intertemporal arbitrage, on the basis- of at least 
de-facto1 divergent beliefs.
However, there are also three sources of transactions
where beliefs may not diverge. Part of the transaction
demand resulting from a change in beliefs may be accomodated
by those who managed to establish open positions before the
change in beliefs gained much market weight and who now want
2to close out at a profit . Another part may come from those 
who try to cut losses, i.e. who in fact now believe that the 
price movement is going irreversibly against their own prior 
beliefs. Finally some traders, particularly scalpers, may 
accommodate some of the forementioned transactions demand as 
well as (net) routine hedging by assuming new open positions, 
although their beliefs do not diverge from the prevailing 12
1. De facto, because a narrowing or widening of the basis (the difference 
between actuals' and futures price) will, in general, also affect the 
futures price.
2. Even closing out may be based on divergent beliefs. In this case, 





























































































market price. The remuneration for this service of making 
a price could consist of commissions and of a temporary 
widening of the bid-offer spread 1. However the latter 
means in fact that market conditions allow some movement 
away from the subjectively expected actuals' price in 
order to provide a sufficient change to earn a return 
from trading at a "false" price. From the point of view 
of the routine hedger this would be a risk premium he is 
prepared to pay.
The above view of the interplay of individual trading 
decisions in futures leads to the following conclusions :
Traders tend to be induced to take an open position 
in futures in a discretionary way if, according to 
their own informative situation and intuition, they 
anticipate that the current futures price will change,
i.e. if they in fact consider the current price to be 
a wrong forecast of the closing price and hence of the 
future actuals' price. Only at the closing of trade 
is a consensus imposed upon traders by the facts of 
the actuals' market.
At any time before the close of trading, changes in 
futures prices indicate that changes in beliefs of 
traders have received sufficient market weight. But 
any traded price in this interim period cannot represent 
a consensus of beliefs, at least as long as new open 
positions are still being established. It reflects 
rather a temporary equilibrium of divergent beliefs, 
arresting the price movement until changes in beliefs 
resulting from changes in informative situations gain 
sufficient weight again.
1. One of the first who has drawn attention to this function of scalpers 




























































































If divergent beliefs are essential for speculative 
trading in general and futures trading in particular 
and if allowance is also made for the possibility that 
some traders may not trust their beliefs with respect 
to future actuals' prices and resort to routine hedging, 
then this represents "a fatal objection to the introd­
uction of any aggregates or averages of expectations 
into economic reasoning" 1. The inappropriateness of
a concept of "representative expectations" or a "suit^
2able average of traders' beliefs" for speculative
markets also invalidates many econometric estimates of
3expectation formation in those markets
The attitude towards risk alone does not explain discret­
ionary participation in futures trading. However, the 
degree of risk aversion may inversely affect the decision
of potential traders to use a change in their informative
4situation and the related change in beliefs . As a 
consequence there may be differences in the speed and the 
size of price reactions to changes in informative situat­
ions in an individual market and between different futures 
markets.
A hedger in the conventional sense who manages to trade 
and re-trade in futures at a profit which can be set 
against an incurred loss in actuals has, in fact, transfer­
red his risk. But in the case of discretionary hedging the 1234
1. R.G. Hawtrey (1939/40), p. 203.
2. Striking empirical evidence of how meaningless the average can be in view 
of the highly diverse individual expectations has been provided by E.O. 
Heady, D.R. Kaldor (1954) , p. 38.
3. The fact that quite a number of single-equation estimates of expectation 
formation in speculative markets prove to be significant by conventional 
standards dees not necessarily lend itself as a strong counterargument. 
This seemingly positive evidence which refers particularly to forward 
markets in foreign exchange suffers frem two defects : (1) Since the 
specification of the expectation formation implies in general an auto-- 
regressive structure, significant results can be obtained relatively 
easily. (2) Very frequently it turned out to be difficult to discriminate 
between the various concepts of expectation formation. Hence the evidence 
does not appear very conclusive.




























































































risk transfer is the result of his forecast of the 
future actuals' price or of a change in the basis 
proving to be superior compared to the forecast of 
the holder of the opposite position. In the case of 
pure routine hedging in an unbiased market it can 
hardly be more than chance.
Since forecasting quality is decisive for deriving 
non-random profits from futures trading, it pays to 
improve the forecasting basis. Besides trying to 
improve forecasting skills, the most promising way 
to achieve this is to aim for and consequently make 
use of, an informational advantage over other potential 
traders 1. Whether a given piece of information repre­
sents an advantage, however, will be found out only 
via the clearing process of the market.
3. A division of labour in information activities
Starting from the contention that traders act on 
divergent beliefs based on different or even equal, inform­
ative situations, the futures market represents a clearing 
centre for what can be interpreted as a division of labour 
in information activities. Futures markets provide merely 1
a special solution to the Hayekian problem of the "Division 
2of Knowledge" . In futures analysis, the problem has been
3most clearly defined by Working : "The amount of pertinent 
information potentially available to traders in most modern 
markets is far beyond what any one trader can both acquire 
and use to good effect. Circumstance and inclination lead 
different traders to seek out and use different sorts of 
available information ; and if at any time some sort of 123
1. This has already been emphasized more than 30 years ago by H. Working 
(1949, p. 155), when he pointed out the fact that "many traders in 
futures markets give a great part of their attention to acquiring 
information which has not become generally available, and thus has not 
been reflected in market expectations".
2. F.A. von Hayek (1937), p. 49.




























































































available and useful information is being generally 
neglected, someone is likely soon to discover that that 
neglect offers him a profitable field to exploit. In 
short, traders are forced and induced to engage in a sort 
of informal division of labour in their use of available 
information. Using different information, different traders 
must find themselves often of different opinion,..".
Again, this clearing function of futures trading may
become inaccessible by an abstraction. Most models of
futures markets dichotomize the market participants into
hedgers and speculators in the conventional sense 1. If,
however, the multitude of observable types of transactions
is taken into account, it becomes apparent that the price
for a given futures contract is assessed by the market
participants correspondingly from quite different perspect- 
2ives . Considering the major types of transactions, the 
relevant information and beliefs may be related to
individual futures prices : speculation in futures in 
the conventional sense ;
differences between futures prices and corresponding 
current actuals' prices as well as the way in which 
changes in these differences may be brought about : 
the various, differently motivated, types of hedging ;
differences between (a) prices for the same contract
but with different closing dates, (b) prices for different 12
1. A notable exception are M.H. Peston and B.S. Yamey (1960) , who show 
that price formation on futures markets already becomes quite complex 
and indeterminable if storage decisions are considered in addition to 
straight-forward hedging and speculation.
2. For a more elaborate presentation of what follows, c.f. M.E. Streit and 




























































































contracts referring to substitutable commodities but 
with equal closing dates, (c) prices for different 
contracts for the same commodity but at different 
exchanges : intracommodity, intercommodity, and inter­
market spreading ;
differences between (a) prices for the same contract 
at different exchanges and (b) prices for a futures 
contract and the corresponding actuals : pure inter­
market and intertemporal arbitrage respectively.
In view of the fact that information is costly to 
procure and to process, also in terms of opportunity costs 
of time, and that its return in terms of improving trading 
decisions is uncertain, it is likely that market participants 
specialize in their information activities. This can be 
achieved, first, by concentrating on information which is of 
special relevance to a particular type of transaction. For 
example, a search for information which may give a clue to 
the size of a future crop will be a more likely activity for 
speculation in the conventional sense than an inquiry into 
changes in the costs of substitution for two traded commo­
dities which will be of particular importance for intermarket 
spreading. Second, the costs of information procurement can 
be reduced by concentrating on fields of information which 
are more easily accessible because they are closely related 
to a trader's business in actuals or other experience. Although 
assumed in some recent models of speculative markets, it 
does not seem plausible that, for example, producers, traders 
and processors of a commodity will not use their business know­
ledge when making trading decisions 1. Third, specialization 
on a particular kind of information may help to economize on 
evaluation as a matter of experience (learning by doing). This 
would be consistent with the observation that traders on futures
1. This is one of the strange features of the similarly structures models 
by S.J. Grossman (1976, 1977) and by S.J. Grossman and J.S. Stiglitz 
(1976, 1980). A crucial role in explaining a possible breakdown of 
futures trading is played by a class of uninformed traders who "form 
their beliefs about a future price from the information of informed 





























































































markets tend to specialize in certain types of transactions1. 
All this does not exclude the possibility that some inform­
ation may also be acquired just by chance.
ing
The fragmented information and the individual beliefs 
which are related to it, become part of the social process 
of the division of labour in information activities as soon 
as individuals try to trade on the basis of their beliefs.
The belief or objective knowledge on which an attempt to 
trade is based will diffuse faster the more it is shared 
by others. The latter may be the result (1) of independently 
formed beliefs, (2) of information activities induced by the 
observed trading attempts of others, (3) of imitation, i.e. 
"going with the market", and (4) of attempts to "read" the 
behaviour of major traders when they try to establish posi­
tions, i.e. Keynes' "beauty contest".
A full internalization of what later on turns out to be 
an informative advantage over other traders is only possible 
if (1) the derivable beliefs are not initially shared with 
others and (2) trade can be conducted on these beliefs at 
the prevailing market price. In this case a price movement . 
in the anticipated direction will only take place when the 
change in the informative situation and when similar beliefs 
gain sufficient market weight. However, no individual trader 
can avoid announcing a potential information advantage via 
his attempt to trade. Hence his attempt to use information 
produces external effects. The medium through which the 
information is transmitted as an external effect, although 
in a codified way, is -as always in the case of externalities-
1. The observable specialization of seme local traders not only on 





























































































a public good : the futures market. The initial signal 
is a combined quantity-price signal, i.e. the quantity 
offered to be traded at the prevailing or a stated price.
The trading which may follow such an initial signal 
and the market process in general can be interpreted as 
an information clearing in the following sense. Any market 
signal will be assessed by different traders (1)out of equal 
but also different perspectives in terms of the type of 
transactions envisaged, and (2) on the basis of a fragment­
ed knowledge which is mainly the result of a specialization 
in information activities and of the experience acquired 
with the different types of transactions. In this way a 
futures price will not only be revised in the light of 
changing and divergent beliefs but also be kept in line 
with both contracts of different maturity dates and the 
development on the actuals' market as well as the conditions 
in futures markets for the various kinds of substitutes.
These rather complex feed-back processes and the accumulation 
of information over time with respect to the likely actuals' 
price constitute the core of a process of transient 
convergence to the actuals' price of maturity1.
4. Informational externalities, time and equilibrium 
A revealing_impossibility_theorem
The interpretation and modelling of futures trading as
a process during which information is disseminated as an
external effect of trading activity has led more recently
2to the formulation of an impossibility theorem. It serves as 12
1. If this process, involving diverging beliefs, is crucial for the 
handling of the information problem on speculative markets, one 
must seriously question the purpose of exercises which "deal 
exclusively with the case of a ccnmon prior distribution (of 
beliefs, M.E.S.) for all agents" (J.Green, 1981, p. 335) and still 
refer to futures trading.
2. Cf. the already quoted articles by S.J. Grossman and J.E. Stiglitz, 
particularly however S.J. Grossman (1977), because of the explicit 




























































































an argument against Faina's widely used proposition that in
efficient speculative markets at any time prices fully
reflect all available information . Leaving aside the
usefulness of the proposition in this context which also
concerns the assumption of costless information and its
consequence that markets and the price system as a "mechanism
2for communicating information" would,in principle, no 
longer be required, the impossibility theorem itself is 
derived in a quite revealing way. It is basically the result 
of a constructed free-rider problem which leads to an 
erosion of futures markets as public goods. The possibility 
of a free ride in information activities is constructed by 
assuming (1) that traders have to decide whether they want 
to be informed by acquiring costly information about future 
economic conditions (states of the world) or not and (2)
3that all traders from Muth-rational expectations which are 
specific in the sense that they know under which economic 
conditions which market-clearing price occurs but also vice 
versa, i.e. from observed prices they can infer correctly
4the underlying information on future economic conditions 
If then prices convey all information which informed traders 
collect, other traders could get the information free by 
just observing market prices. Given the possibility of a 
free ride there would be no incentive to collect information. 
Hence speculative markets cannot be informationally efficient. 
Their signals have to be sufficiently noisy to make inform­
ation activities profitable by allowing trade based on 
divergent beliefs.
The theorem is revealing because it throws some light 
on the inadequacy of the abstraction from time and the 1234
1. E.F. Fana (1970) , p. 383.
2. F.A. Hayek (1945), p. 526.
3. J.F. Math (1961) . The term Muth-rational is used following W.H. Buiter's 
(1980, p. 35) argument that they are not generated by a rational cost- 
benefit calculus applied to information activities.
4. Following R. Radner (1979), the corresponding rational expectations 
equilibrium is a revealing full cannunication equilibrium. It is 
one-to-one in the sense that it maps different signals into distinct 
price vectors which then allows to infer the underlying signal frcm 




























































































related limitations of temporary equilibrium analysis1.
Time_and_informational_adyantage
According to the impossibility theorem, noise in
the dissemination of information via prices is a necessary
condition in order to establish a profitable advantage of
the informed traders over the uninformed. The condition,
whether realistic or not, becomes necessary because the
2analysis abstracts from time . If the collection and 
dissemination of information in speculative markets is in 
essence a process, comparative static analysis must be 
inadequate. But it may nevertheless be useful to identify 
some misconceptions resulting from the attempt to abstract 
from time.
The informational externality created via trading can 
only endanger the existence of a speculative market if an 
informed trader has no chance to trade before his new 
informative situation has become general. As already argued 
(section 2), a trader cannot avoid announcing his divergent 
beliefs if he wants to trade correspondingly. However, the 
smaller the market weight of his transaction demand and 
the less he has to share the informative advantage with 
others, the greater his chance to trade at a price which 
is false in the light of his beliefs and to re-trade at a 
profit if his beliefs turn out to be correct.
The result which this kind of reasoning has in common 
with the discussed theorem is that speculative markets 12
1. Specific limitations of the used class of rational expectations 
are sketched by R. Radner, op. cit.
2. This criticism of the theorem is also made by M.F. Hellwig (1981). 
Equally, R. Radner (1979) mentions this deficiency in passing





























































































cannot be informationally efficient in the sense of Fama. 
But there exists an important difference. In the case of 
the theorem, informational inefficiency is a necessary 
condition for the existence of such markets. However, in 
terms of market dynamics, inefficiency is part of the 
process of discovery and communication of information. 
Noise guarantees a kind of rent distributable to informed 
traders which must be sufficiently high to cover their 
costs of being informed . However, in a dynamic context, 
inefficiency in the above sense is the result of some 
traders being able to trade at a temporary informative 
advantage. The derived profit can be interpreted as a 
premium for being faster in the acquisition and correct 
reading of new pieces of information, and also for re­
interpretating already available information more quickly. 
The premium is highly uncertain and exposed to the 
competitive information activities of other traders. This 
competition for a temporary informational monopoly 
determines not only the informational quality of prices 
but also the speed at which changes in beliefs and under­
lying information are disseminated. As in other cases of 
socially useful competition, inefficiency from a static 
point of view can be the source of dynamic efficiency.
And from this perspective of discovery and adaptation, the
2basically static verdict of Pareto non-optimality carries 
little weight if any. 12
1. In passing, a further implausible result related to the required 
noise may be worth mentioning. When introducing futures trading 
for a storable canmodity it seems necessary to add even more 
noise to the system. Because the uninformed have now two prices 
frcm which to infer, it is argued that the initially introduced 
noise will be completely ramoved from the system (S.J. Grossman,
1977, p. 443). This requires the absence of a feedback mechanism 
between futures and actuals price. However, in the case of 
storable goods this feedback is provided by intertemporal arbitrage.
As a consequence, futures and actuals' prices become highly correlated, 
at least in periods of a negative difference between actuals'
and futures price (positive carrying charge).
2. E.g. S.J. Grossman (1976), p. 584 ; S.J. Grossman, J.E. Stiglitz 





























































































There is a further difficulty of comparative statics 
which is also demonstrated by the analysis underlying the 
impossibility theorem. It is related to the analytical 
need to solve the problem in one step starting from the 
description of the solution, i.e. the equilibrium conditions 
being fulfilled. In the case of the basic model underlying 
the theorem, the difficulty can be demonstrated by asking 
how the information acquired by some traders is signalled 
into the system. The analytical approach can be interpreted 
as allowing in fact only one round of trading during which 
a new equilibrium has to be found. This requires that the 
information be conveyed to the uninformed before any 
transaction has taken place, which corresponds to the 
assumption of a Walrasian tâtonnement.
The forementioned assumption could be approximated in 
a more practical way by requiring that the information be 
conveyed via the prices asked by those who would like to 
make transactions on the basis of a new informative situation. 
However this is implausible because those who anticipate a 
price change on the basis of acquired information would 
like to trade at the prevailing futures price in order to 
be able to re-trade at a profit. It shows again that this 
kind of analysis can hardly explain the communication via 
markets.
5. Equilibrium, uncertainty and rational expectations
A_2EE(Bi22_§2lHti22_f2E_2_EEE2E2i2l_EE2fri!:5}
An important feature of the more recent models of 
speculative markets is the way in which equilibrium is 
brought about. The perennial problem of equilibrium analysis 
seems to have been solved. It appears possible to drop the 
assumption of correct foresight which so far has reduced 
equilibrium analysis to an exercise in pure logic. The 
problem has been clearly stated by von Hayek some 45 years 
ago1, namely "how the spontaneous interaction of a number




























































































of people, each possessing only bits of knowledge, brings 
about a state of affairs ... which could be brought about 
by deliberate action only by somebody who possesses the 
combined knowledge of all those individuals".
The suggested solution consists of the proposition 
that expectations have to be rational in the sense of Muth. 
Then the economic agents are able to derive subjective 
probability distributions of future actuals' prices condition­
al on their informative situation, and for all of them 
these distributions correspond to the objective conditional 
probability distribution. In other words, they are able 
to make best, unbiased predictions conditional on their 
informative situation, communication of information via 
prices is possible and, without noise, it could even be 
perfect if prices reflect a revealing full communication 
equilibrium. Those who do not possess a certain piece of 
information can then infer from the observed price the 
underlying information.
If rational expectations represent unbiased predict­
ions they must be formed by simultaneously taking into 
account the market clearing conditions. Under such 
conditions convergence to an equilibrium, or in the case 
of noise, to "an equilibrium degree of disequilibrium"1) 
can be secured. But how much does this rational expect­
ations equilibrium differ from the empirically empty 
equilibrium criticized by von Hayek ? "It appears that 
the concept of equilibrium merely means that the foresight 
of different members of the society is in a special sense 
correct. It must be correct in the sense that every person's 
plan is based on the expectation of just those actions of 
other people which those other people intend to perform,




























































































and that all of these plans are based on the expectation 
of the same set of external facts, so that under certain 
conditions nobody will have any reason to change plans"!'
I222£2^_2ki22ti22§
Even if one leaves aside this, in a sense anticipatory, 
objection, it is surprising how little impact contemporary 
and competent criticism has so far had on the use of Muth- 
rational expectations in modelling markets as information 
systems. One apparent attraction of rational expectations 
in general is that they imply that a future price cannot 
be known perfectly and should rather be conceptualized as 
a random variable with a probability distribution and an 
expected value. However, the additional assumption that 
market participants do not only take into account the 
random character but also decide on the knowledge of the 
true probability distribution reduces again the realism 
of the proposition. What remains is a weaker form of the 
Arrow-Debreu theorem for a general intertemporal equilibrium 
which proves that perfect foresight produces consistent 
results .
A second objection is related to the decision situation 
implied by rational expectations. The expected value of 
the conditional probability distribution is usually and 
conveniently  ̂ supposed to be the only statistic relevant 
for the decision of an individual. Seen as a process, which 
remains completely unexplored, the market participants 
are assumed to be able to learn the true probability 
distribution, for example, in a conventional Bayesian way. 
However, this seems to be reasonable only "in the tranquillity
4of a long-run steady-state equilibrium" . And this corresponds 1234
1. F.A. von Hayek (1937), p. 41
2. K.J. Arrow (1978), p. 159. For an early statement and qualification 
of thè basic idea see thè model of a pure "Futures Econany" by
J.R. Hicks (1939, pp. 136, 138).
3. As pointed out by R.J. Shiller (1978, p. 4) .




























































































to "insisting that the long period means long enough,
that trial and error must be supposed to continue until
all error has been exhausted and wisdom at last distilled"1.
The objection does not imply the denial of opportunities
of learning. In the case of futures markets experience can
be a valuable capital. But even if the price-generating
process were stable, of which nobody could be sure, there
would still remain the possibility of shocks which are2difficult to identify . Otherwise speculation purely based 
on charting would have proven to be a much more profitable 
approach.
A third objection is related to the second and refers
to a further aspect of the concept of the steadv state
treating time with disdain by assuming it to be "of so
3little consequence that any amount can be used up" . On 
futures markets time is moving underneath a whole series 
of contracts expiring at different dates, with new contracts 
being consecutively added to it. Their quotations are 
highly interdependent mainly because of spreading and, 
in the case of storable commodities, because of intertemporal 
arbitrage. This reflects a basic property of the actuals' 
price at maturity of a contract. It is not a closed-end fix- 
point in time to which both, actuals' and futures price, 
tend to converge. It is as transient as the separation of 
the past from the future by the present. "The shadow of
4the future and future's future" is always present in 
speculative markets. To ignore it represents an abstraction, 
the inadequacy of which is particularly striking in the case 
of futures trading.
But perhaps the most important argument against Muth- 1234
1. G.L.S. Shackle (1972), p. 128.
2. E.g. J. Tobin (1980), p. 25.
3. G.L.S. Shackle (1972), p. 127.




























































































rational expectations is that they are conducive to a 
complete misconception of the market process The major 
advantage of competitive markets is the ability to merge 
and communicate highly diverse pieces of information. 
Speculative markets, including the comparatively few 
futures markets, serve as clearing centres for different 
beliefs based not only on general categories of information 
but also on the knowledge of individual circumstances 
which nobody else may have. Under such conditions it is 
an inadequate abstraction to assume that the beliefs of 
the market participants are based on the same general
2economic model or even sufficient approximations of it 
Furthermore, while markets are supposed to allow economies 
not only of information procurement, but also of information 
processing ability as a scarce resource, rational expects 
ations in a sense imply abundance of both. They require 
from market participants a superior performance when 
deriving their subjective probability distribution and 
reading market signals 3. And if they all performed in 
this manner, trading on speculative markets would have 
to be artificially revitalized by introducing noise.
A potentially misleading way to defend rational expect^ 
ations is to argue that they may be approximated particularly 
within the limited framework of a single market. This would 
be the case if there existed a small number of very sophist-
4icated and highly professional forecasters . Such a market 1234
1. K.J. Arrow (1978), pp. 164 f.
2. Hence it means severely underrating the abstraction if it is argued 
that "a thorough theoretical analysis of this situation probably 
requires a more detailed specification of the trading mechanism 
than is usual in general equilibrium analysis. Nevertheless, it is 
tarpting to try to obtain results that are as independant as possible 
of the specifics of the trading mechanism, by using seme suitable 
concept of equilibrium" (R. Radner, 1979, p. 255).
3. For one of the few empirical analyses, providing evidence of only a 
moderate sophistication in forming expectations, see E.O. Heady,
D.R. Kaldor (1954).




























































































structure would allow "a kind of weeding-out process
over time by which those w„ith inferior information
gradually loose money to those whose information is
better, with the result that in the long run the market
puts the heaviest weight on the best information in
forming a market price"1. But this view can be misleading
because it disregards at least two important facets of
speculative markets. There is, first, a turnover of market
participants which means that different forecasting2abilities will prevail and disturb this kind of converg­
ence to informational efficiency of the market. Secondly, 
the observable division of labour in procuring and process­
ing information and the specialization on specific kinds 
of transactions is ignored. Under such circumstances 
superior forecasting ability is a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition for lasting success.
A final argument to defend Muth-rational expectations 
would in fact be rather agnostic with respect to the 
functioning of markets as information systems. It would 
start with Muth's observation that "information is scarce,
3and the economic system generally does not waste it"
And it would take note of his rejection "that the scratch 
work of entrepreneurs resembles the system of equations 
(representing the relevant economic theory, M.E.S.) in any 
way ; nor does it state that predictions of entrepreneurs
4are perfect or that their expectations are all the same"
The defensive conclusion which could be drawn from these 
two assertions is that competitive speculative markets 
perform as if rational expectations were dominant. But this 
would imply, also for Muth, a disclamation of knowledge on 
how expectations are actually formed. It would secure the 
observable informational efficiency on these markets. However, 
the theory of rational expectations would be reduced to an 1234
1. S. Figlewski (1978) , p. 596.
2. K.J. Arrow (1978), p. 165.
3. J.F. Muth (1961), p. 316.




























































































Alice-in-Wonderland proposition, i.e. "a grin without 
a cat".
6. Possible analytical revisions
To criticize the discussed abstractions of more recent 
models of speculative markets is not to deny the possibility 
of modelling these markets at all in order to be able to 
analyse them. It implies merely a pledge to avoid abstractions 
and analytical approaches, the use of which is bound to 
produce misleading results in view of the phenomenon to be 
dealt with. The then remaining research programme is still 
extremely challenging and can be only illustrated here :
If rational expectations only allow the derivation of 
"a grin without a cat" and not a testable proposition 
about traders' formation of expectations, they un­
necessarily complicate the analysis of the aggregate 
performance of speculative markets. Efforts to analyse 
market efficiency which are centred around the concept 
of the random walk 1 and efficiency tests via the 
search for profitable trading rules can do without this 
concept.
If the information activities of traders and the 
information diffusion in particular as well as the 
structure of speculative trading in general cannot 
be plausibly modelled within a comparative static frame­
work, the admirable technical and analytical skill 
devoted to this kind of modelling could be more efficient­
ly used in the design of dynamic or at least quasi- 
2dynamic models. Possible unsatisfactory results in 
terms of highly complex or even indeterminate solutions 
would be less deceiving than the determinateness of 
static equilibria. 12
1. For an early and clear presentation of the basic argument see 
H. Working (1949), pp. 160 ff.
2. The modelling of a temporary informational advantage and of the 
resulting inefficiency by M.F. Hellwig (1981) , although still 





























































































If the informal division of labour in information 
activities is reflected to a considerable extent by 
a specialization of traders in terms of transactions, 
such an institutional aspect can hardly be abstracted 
from1. This is all the more important because there 
are still unexplored possibilities to model the 
transient convergence to the actuals' price at mature 
ity of a contract via the interplay of this multitude 
of differently structured transactions.
If divergent beliefs are essential in explaining
speculative trading, expectations must be modelled
accordingly although not more that a rough approximation
will ever be possible in view of the basic criticism
that there is no way to aggregate divergent beliefs
even on a small scale. However, it may be worth trying
to segment the market according to transactions and
positions taken and to analyse the consequences of
2correspondingly segmented expectations .
Whether, however, it will be possible to model 
convincingly the spontaneous information process on 
speculative markets with the currently available analytical 
tools and concepts, may still be doubted. But using in­
adequate abstractions to shape the economic problem in a 
way which allows the application of an analytical instrument 
does hardly lead to more than a pretense of knowledge. 12
1. A first step away frcm this abstraction represents the already 
quoted paper by M.H. Peston and B.S. Yamey (1960).
2. The segmentation into transactions and, in the case of speculation, 
into long and short positions, as used by B.A. Goss and D.E.A. Giles 
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